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1. 0 INTRODUCTION 
The results of the reliability prediction and failure modes and effects 
analysis for the ALSEP A2 Dual 90 Channel Multiplexer are documented 
in this report. This multiplexer represents the Bendix designed unit 
which utilizes MOS-FET integrated circuits. The multiplexer was 
integrated with the Dynatronics A/D Converter. This design now 
provided complete redundancy for ALSEP Housekeeping engineering 
status data while retaining the interface design requirements specified 
for basic ALSEP. 
The reliability prediction for the Dual 90 Channel Multiplexer and 
A/D Converter is calculated to be 0. 9981 for one year of lunar opera-
tion, which exceeds the specified design goal of 0. 9956. All relia-
bility objectives have been achieved or exceeded. 
2. 0 RELIABILITY PREDICTION 
The reliability prediction for the Dual 90 Channel Multiplexer and 
A/D Converter, operating in the standby redundant configuration, 
is calculated to be 0. 9981 for launch, deployment, and one year of 
lunar operation. The predicted reliability exceeds the specified 
goal of 0. 9956. 
Figure 1 defines the reliability block diagram and mathematical 
model for the Multiplexer and A/D convert component. The standby 
elements are activated by earth command. Functionally, the system 
operates in conjunction with the redundant Data Processor. However, 
the Data Processor was not included as part of this analysis. 
The failure rates for each functional component identified in Figure 1 
are tabulated in Table I. The failure rates shown represent com-
posite totals derived from the part application stress ratios of each 
electronic piece part. The application reflects the anticipated "use 11 
environment. 
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TABLE I 
FAILURE RATE SUMMARY 
A oi (%11000 Hrs.) A si (%11000 Hrs.) 
Assembly A i Operating 
90 Channel 1 0.1445 
MOS-FET's 
Sequencer 2 0.387611 
Buffer Amp. 3 0.08579 
AID Converter 4 0.05350 
Output Buffer 5 0.01426 
Circuit 
TOTALS ~. A i 0.685661 
Reliability Calculation 
-5 
- (0. 53211lx10 ) (8760. 52) -0. 046616 
RMUX = E = E 
= o. 9544691 
-5 
-(0. 15364xl0 ) (8760. 52) -0.01346 
RAID = E = E 
= o. 986591 
RS = RMUX. RAID= (0. 9544691) (0. 986591) 
= 0. 9416706 (non-redundant System) 
Standby 
0.0001445 
0.0003876 
0.01349 
0.01501 
0.00402 
0.033052 
RS = (0. 685661) (0. 033052) (0. 0876052) 2- r (0. 685661) (0. 0876052)] 2 
2 2 
= 1- (0. 0001 7388) 
2 
0. 0036081 = 1- 0. 00008694- o. 00180405 
2 
= o. 998109 (Standby Redundant System) 
Failure 
Rate 
Source 
ATM-860A 
ATM-860A 
ATM-~74G 
ATM-274G 
ATM-274G 
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3. 0 FAILURE MODES, EFFECTS & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
The failure mode and effects analysis for the 90 Channel Multiplexer 
are documented in Tables II and III. Table II describes the functional 
failure modes and the resultant effects on the end item and system 
level. Table II delineates the failure modes at the piece part level. 
Each identified failure is numerically itemized for eros s reference 
between Tables II and III. (Note: the cross reference must be 
correlated by Assembly). 
The Failure probabilities reflect the identified line item. The criti-
cality ranking lists, by order of magnitude, the highest down to the 
lowest failure probabilities. Subcategories of failures (e. g., 2. l 
2.2 of 2.0) are not ranked. 
The format of Tables II and III is designed to provide the reader with 
a narrative description of the varying types of failures that could 
occur, combined with the resultant performance characteristics. 
This information is useful to system support in performing fault 
isolation should an anomally occur. 
There are no ALSEP single point failures in either the 90 Channel 
Multiplexer or the A/D converter. Careful parts selection and 
circuit design coupled with the switching of most supply voltages 
in the redundant units has enabled the Bendix design to have zero 
single point failures. Failure Mode l. 1 of Table II implies a loss 
of a single housekeeping data channel. This loss cannot be 
restored by switching the redundant unit. This is a single thread 
failure for one channel only, the other 89 channels are unaffected. 
Thus, only 1 o/o of the total functional ability of the multiplexer is 
lost with this one and only single thread failure mode. Further 
discussion will be found under Reliability Assessment on Page 6 
of this ATM. 
The loss of both 90 Channel Multiplexers or A/D converters will not 
cause the loss of any science data except for the dust detector, since 
this is the only science data handled by the multiplexer. Other than 
the dust detector, the 90 Channel Multiplexer handles only house-
keeping data. 
The A/D converter is treated in the reliability prediction but since 
the design of the A/D converter has not been changed, the FMECA 
for the converter is not included in this ATM. The A/D converter 
FMECA may be found in ATM 501, the complete FMECA for The 
ALSEP System. 
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4. 0 RELIABILITY ASSESSMENT 
The purpose of performing a reliability prediction and failure modes 
analysis is to identify inherent design weaknesses. From the results 
of these analyses it has been concluded the reliability and design objectives 
have been fully satisfied. 
With exception to one failure mode the multiplexer is mutually exclusive 
of its redundant counterpart. That is, full capability can be restored 
by switching to the redundant unit. The exception is item 1. 1 of Table II. 
The failure mode is a loss of one ( 1) housekeeping data channel caused 
by an electrical short between the drain and substrate of a 1st tier MOS- FET 
gate on the multiplexer gate assembly. What happens is the +12V supply, 
which presently is not switched, will feed back into the analog source, 
thus offsetting the analog data signal being sampled by the redundant 
multiplexer. This failure mode was identified early in the design phase 
arrl prompted a reliability investigation. The results of the investigation 
disclosed that switching off the +l2V supply was feasible. However to 
implement this capability would necessitate a modification of the PCU 
mother board assembly. In addition, the central station interface require-
ment would have to be modified. This in turn would preclude the inter-
changeability between multiplexers of previous arrays as is presently 
required. 
The system criticality of the subject failure mode is low, therefore, the 
reliability improvement that would have been derived if the switching 
capability was incorporated would nothave offset the program impact 
relative to cost and schedule. Therefore, the decision was made not to 
incorporate the tl2V switching capability into the A2 system. However, 
in the event future ALSEP systems are built (Apollo 17 and subsequent) 
it is recommended the +12V switching capability be incorporated. 
TABLE II 
!SYSTEM 
ALSEP (A2) 
~ Multiplexer 90 CH. 
fRF.P~ 
J. Mansour 
~~~9oo 
FAILURE MODE, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS ~ Gate Brd 1 &2 ~Wo3/89o6 
CIRCUIT 
OR 
FUNCTION 
ASSUMED FAILURE MODE 
1. 0 First Tier II. 0 Loss of one (1) Housekeeping 
MOS-FET Gates Data Channel. 
2. 0 First Tier 12. 0 Loss of six (6\ Housekeeping 
MOS-FET Gates Data Channels 
CAUSE OF FAILURE 
I. 0 Loss of one (1) FET gate in th 
1st Tier, caused by the following 
rnode of failure 
1. 1 Short: Drain to Substrate 
1. 2 Electrical Short form Drain 
to Gate, or Gate to Substrate. 
I. 3 Open circuit on input terminal 
of Drain or Gate of one MOS FET. 
b.VT> (!Ov) 
2. 0 Failure of a six (6) ch. MOS 
YET in a manner such as to rende 
the part totally inoperative. The 
15 M•.:)S FET 6 ch parts that com-
prut dse the lst Tier can fail in 
t'[!e identified mode. 
2. I Open circuit on the source or 
substrate output/input terminal. 
2. 2 Electrical short from Source-
Substrate, Source-Drain or Sourc 
to Gate for HK channels 85-90 only 
EFFECT CF FAILURE 
END ITEM 
1. 0 Multiplexer will continue to 
operate, minus the loss of the 
affected channel 
1. 1 +l2v signal will be sampled 
for A/D conversion. 
SYSTEM 
I. 0 Minor degradation of overall 
system performance. Full data inl 
formation can be restored via 
redundant multiplexer, except for 
item 1. 1 
I. I Affected HK Data appears as 
I. 2 Analog channel will not turn I all "Is" regardless of selected 
on. redundant multiplexer. Remainin 
89HK channels are good. 
1. 3 Analog channel will not turn 
on. I 1. 2 Affected HK Data appears as 
2. 0 Multiplexer will continue to 
operate minus the loss of the 
six affected data channels. 
2. I Loss of substrate voltage 
precludes turn-on of FET gate. 
Six gates per chip are summed 
at the source terminal, thus 
preventing data transfer to the 
A/D converter. 
all ''0s". 
1. 3 Same as 1. I. 2 
2. 0 System performance is furthe 
degraded, but considered minor 
unless the affected data channels 
are critical for system perfor-
mance. 
2. l Data for six consecutive HK 
channels will read all 11 0s 11 • 
2. 2 HK Data for chs 85-90 would 
be erroneous. Could read either 
2. 2 The eighth bank of lst Tier I all "0s" or all "ls". 
has only six data channels. Thi 
failure mode in other data banks 
would affect 12 channels. 
flfrM-863 F· 
~GE 7 of 18 
~TE 
'Ma_y_ 28, 1970 
FAILURE 
PROBABILITY 
Q x IC-'5 
801.717 
133.617 
200. 43 
467.67 
20.78 
5.94 
14.84 
CRITIC-
ALITY 
3 
CIRCUIT 
OR 
FUNCTION 
3. 0 MOS-FET 
Multiplexer Gate 
E 
0 Second Tier 
OS-FET Gates 
n Assy Board 
o. 2. 
TABLE II 
!SYSTEM rRFP.!.RED BY 
ALSEP (A2.) J. Mansour 
~ I~ 90 CH. Multiplexer 2.338900 
Ff:rM-863 r· 
~GE 8 of 18 
FAILURE MODE, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS ~Gate Brd. 1&2. fre~b3/8906 PA:J~v 28. 1970 
ASSUMED FAILURE MODE 
3. 0 Loss of twelve (12) House-
keeping Data Channels 
3. l Failure of a I st Tier MO.---
FET part. 
3. 2. Failure of a 2nd Tier MOS-
Fet part (one channel only) 
4. 0 Loss of Forty-two (42.) 
Housekeeping Data Channels. 
CAUSE OF FAILURE 
3 .. 0 Failure of a six channel MOS-
FET part in one of the identified 
modes. 
3. 1 Electrical short cct source 
to substrate, Drain, or Gate 
F.:FFECT CF FAILURE 
END ITEM 
3. 0 One lst Tier data bank (12. HK 
channels) will be lost Multiplexer 
remains operational but at de-
graded performance level. 
SYSTEM 
3~ 0 Good Housekeeping data re-
duced to 78 channels using the 
failed multiplexer. Full data can 
be restored via redundant multi-
plexer. 
FAILURE I CRITIC-
PROBABI':JT5 Y ALITY Q x IC 
44.39 2. 
3. 2. Electrical short cct from 
Drain to Substrate 
3.1 An error signal (12.v max) will 
be continuously present on the out 
put of the affected data bank. Thi 
voltage will sum with the data 
channel being sampled. 
3: I The digital data for the affecteJ! 20. 78 
12 channels will reflect the sumo 
3. 2.. 1 Electrical short cct from 
Drain to Gate or Gate to Substrate. 
Open circuit on input terminal of 
Drain or Gate of one MOS-FET 
channel. An increase in threshold 
voltage which pre eludes turn- on o 
the MOS-FET. 
3. 2 tl2.v error voltage will be 
summed with the sampled analog 
signal. 
3, 2.. 1 The second Tier analog 
channel will not turn on. 
4. 0 Failure of the. 2nd Tier multi-14. 0 Approximately 4 7% of the 
channel MOS-FE1 that controls Hlf multiplexer becomes inoperative. 
channels 49 thru 90. 
the error voltage and the analog 
signal. 
3; 2. The affected HK Data Bank 
appears as all Hls 11 • 
3. 2. 1 Twelve HK channels of the 
affected bank will appear as all 
110". 
4, 0 Housekeeping data information 
significantly degraded. Full data 
restored via redundant multiplexe 
4. 1 Open circuit on the Source or 
Substrate Output/Input Terminal 
4. 1 Loss of substrate voltage 14. 1 HK channels 49 thru 90 will 
precludes turn-on of any FET gate read all "0s". 
An open source terminal prevents 
data transfer the A/D converter. 
17.82 
57.9 
5.94 6 
5. 94 
!SYSTEM rRFP~Rt.D BY 
ALSEP !A2l l. Mansour fff~M-863 F TABLE II IEFll llEM 1M3 NQ. 
90 CH. Multiplexer 2338900 I'AGE _'L_ of 1 8 
FAILURE MODE, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS ~~Gate Brd. l&zffi}f~·03/8906 DATE. l May 28, 1970 
CIRCUIT 
OR 
FUNCTION 
EFFECT CF FAILURE FAILURE 
PROBABILITY 
Q x 1c-5 
CRITIC-
ALITY ASSUMED FAILURE MODE 
S. 0 Second Tier IS. 0 Loss of Forty-eight (48) 
MOS-FET Gate Housekeeping data channels. 
on A ssy Board 
No. l 
6. 0 Second Tier ,6. 0 Loss of 78 or 84 HK Data 
MOS-FET Gate channels. 
on Assy Board 
No. l or 2 
CAUSE OF FAILURE 
5. 0 Failure of 2nd Tier multi-
channel MOS-FET that controls 
HK channels l-48 
5. l Open circuit on the Source or 
Substrate Output/Input terminal 
6. 0 Failure of either 2nd Tier 6 
channel MOS-FET. 
6. l Electrical short circuit from 
the Source to Drain 
7. 0 Same as 6. 017.0 Loss of all HK Data Channels.! 7. 0 Failure of either 2nd Tier 6 
channel MOS-FET. 
7. 1 Electrical short cct from 
Source to Substrate or Gate. 
END ITEM 
5. 0 S3o/o of the multiplexer become 
inoperative. 
5. l Loss of substrate voltage pre-
cludes turn-on of any FET gate. 
An open source terminal prevents 
data transfer the A/D converter. 
6. 0 The multiplexer becomes 
effectively inoperative. The num-
ber of channels lost is contingent 
on which MOS-FET part that faile 
6. 1 The failed channel controls th 
analog signal of 12 lst gates. The 
eighth 2nd Tier switch controls 
only 6 1st Tier gate. An elect. 
short would result in the summa-
tion of two analog data channels. 
The resultant analog data would 
be in error. 
7. 0 The multiplexer becomes in-
operative. 
7. l A +12v signal will be contin-
uously transmitted to the A/D 
converter as an analog signal. 
7. l. 1 When failed FET gate sig-
nal is at -12v the -12v level (for 
source to gate short) will be 
summed with analog data. 
SYSTEM 
5. 0 Housekeeping data informaticfn 5. 94 
significantly degraded. Full 
data restored via redundant mul-
tiplexer. 
5. l HK channels l-48 will read I 5. 94 
all 11 0 11 s. 
6. 0 All Housekeeping data is I l 7. 82 
effectively lost. Full HK data 
can be restored via redundant 
multiplexer. 
6.1 The 12 (or 6\ analog signals I 17.82 
controlled by the failed FET 
switch would be the only valid 
data. However, practically spea-.-
ing it would be difficult to deter-
mine which data channels were 
correct unless a known analog 
signal was sampled in each lst 
Tier Data Bank. 
7. 0 All HK data is lost. Redun-
dant switch over is required. 
7. 1 All HK Data will read all 
ur ~~s. 
7. l. I Twelve HK channels will 
read all H0 11 s. The remaining 
78 will be all "l"s. 
11. 88 
5.94 
5.94 
6 
4 
5 
CIRCUIT 
OR 
FUNCTION 
!. 0 DTL-MOS 
Interface circuit 
2. 0 Phase Two 
(02) Clock Gen-
erator 
3. 0 Phase One 
(01) Clock Gen-
erator 
TABLE II rs;rt~~p (A2) 
~Multiplexer 90 CH. 
IPRFPARED BY 
J. Mansour 
IDAG NO: 
2338900 
!NO· mt. 
ATM-8631 
~GE 10 of 18 FAILURE MODE, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS pt\~v 28, 1970 7S5'5'V SeQuencer ~Ws9o9 
ASSUMED FAILURE MODE CAUSE OF FAILURE 
!. 0 The DTL-MOS interface cir- I !. 0 Discrete component part 
cuit becomes inoperative. failure. 
1. 1 Voltage level shifter fails in t1el. 1 The output transistor either 
logic 
11
0
11 
state. failed or is slaved in the off state. 
1. 2 Voltage level shifter fails in 
the logic 11 1 11 state 
2, 0 The 02 clock generator cir-
cuit becomes inoperative. 
2. l Loss of 02 clock pulse 
2. 2 02 clock pulse overlaps fl 
clock pulse. 
1. 2 The output transistor stage 
either shorted collector to emitte 
or is slaved in the ON state. 
2. 0 Failure of discrete part(s) or 
MOS logic. 
2. 1 Output of clock generator 
remains in continuous state (either 
+ or - l2v) 
2. 2 Degradation of input coupling 
capacitor causing RC time con-
stant to decrease by a factor 
greater than 10. 
3. 0 The 01 clock generator circuit 3. 0 Failure of discrete part(s) or 
becomes inoperative. MOS logic. 
3. 2 The 01 clock pulse remains a, 3. 1 Output of clock generator 
a continuous logic 11 0 11 • fails in continuous state at t12v. 
3, 3 The ill clock pulse remains 
at a continuous logic 11 1 11 • 
3, 2 Output of clock generator 
fails in continuous state at -12v. 
F.:FFECT CF FAILURE FAILURE 
PROBABILITY 
Q x IC-~ END ITEM 
l. 0 Sequencer shift register will 
not advance. Multiplexer will be 
slaved to the last analog data 
channel sampled. 
1. I A -6v is continuously applied 
to the input of the 02 clock gener-
ator. The multiplexer advance 
pulse is inhibited. 
1. 2 A + 12v is continuously applied 
to the input of the 02 clock gener-
ator. The multiplexer advance 
pulse is inhibited 
2. 0 The shift register can not be 
sequenced. Multiplexer will re-
main in the last analog channel 
sampled. 
2. l li I clock pulse cannot be gen-
erated. Loss of both clock pulses 
disables the shift register. 
2. 2 The shift register will not 
sequence properly if the 01 & 02 
clock pulses overlap. 
3. 0 The shift register cannot be 
sequenced. 
3. 1 The shift register remains in 
SYSTEM 
l. 0 Only one (!\Housekeeping I 371. 045 
Data Channel will be transmitted. 
Switchover to redundant multi-
plexer will restore all Housekeepif'g 
Data. 
150. 145 
220.90 
2. 0 Only one housekeeping data l 17.474 
channel will be transmitted. Switc -
over to the redundant multiplexer 
will restore full Housekeeping 
Data. 
3. 0 Multiplexer becomes inopera-
tive. Backup redundant unit avail 
able. 
15. 149 
2.325 
71. 752 
last state. I 3. 1 One HK data channel will be 28.90 
3. 2 The shift register bit outputs 
will shift to all logic "0" (e. g. , at 
+l2v). 
continuously sampled. 
3. 2 All HK data channels will be 
off. HK telemetry data reads all 
~~o~~s. 
7.419 
CRITIC-
ALITY 
2 
6 
4 
CIRCUIT 
OR 
FUNCTiON 
4. 0 The lst and 
2nd Tier Shift 
Register(s) 
fSYS TEf..l- - jPRFP~RED BY 
ALSEP (A2) J. Mansour 
TABLE II 
FAILURE MODE, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS 
100 ITEM IIJN3 NQ. 
90 Ch. Multiplexer 23 31i'l_OO 
~--y ~NO. Sequencer 2338909 
ASSUMED FAILURE MODE 
3. 4 'l'he fll clock pulse or logic 
for 2nd Tier Gating function be-
comes inoperative. 
3. 4. l Function fails in the logic 
"0' 1 state. 
3. 4, 2 Function fails in the logic 
11 1 11 state. 
4. 0 The 12 Bit Serial to Parallel 
Shift Register (s) become inoper-
ative. 
4. I All output stages fail in the 
logic "0" state. 
4. 2 All output stages fail in the 
logic 11 111 state. 
4. 3 Shift register fails to se-
quence. 
4. 4 Bit output of shift register 
fails in the logic HQn state. 
f:FFECT CF FAILURE 
CAUSE OF FAILURE 
3. 3 MOS logic fails as indicated. 
3. 3. I iJl clock pulse to 2nd shift 
resigter is at continuous +12v. 
3. 3. 2 I'll clock pulse to 2nd shift 
register is at continuous -l2v. 
4. 0 Failure of any stage 
4, I Shift register remains in the 
reset state. 1st stage fails in 
END ITEM 
3. 3 The sequencer operation be-
comes erratic. 
3. 3. l 2nd shift register will hang 
up in the last state. This will 
preclude sequencing of the 2nd 
Tier rr1ultiplexer gate. 
3, 3. 2 All 2nd Tier multiplexer 
gates will eventually turn on. 
4, 0 The shift register controls th 
gating sequence of the 90 channel 
multiplexer. 
reset state. MOS logic (internallf 4. I All multiplexer MOS-FET 
will not accept the initial Vin pui'4e.gates will be turned OFF. 
4. 2 Set output of the l st stage 
fails in the logic 11 0 11 level. Vin 
function remains at -l2v. 
4. 3 Failure of any shift register 
Flip-Flop stage such that it will 
not toggle. The failed stage is 
in the 11 0 11 logic state. 
4. 4 The logic "0" Bit output FET 
fails in the ON mode. 
4. 4. l Failed FET is for l st Tier 
4. 2 All multiplexer gates will be 
turned ON simultaneously. 
4. 3 The shift register will not 
trans fer a logic "l" through the 
failed state. 
4. 4 Loss of multiplexer FET 
gate drive pulse. 
4. 4. 1 Loss of every 12th data 
channels in the 1st Tier. 
SYSTEM 
3. 3 A minimum of 78 HK data 
channels will be lost. 
3. 3. l The 12 HK channels corres 
ponding to the selected 2nd Tier 
FET will be telemetered in the 
data stream. 
3. 3. 2 All HK data will become 
erratic. 
4. 0 Housekeeping data becomes 
degraded or erratic. Switchover 
to redundant unit restores all HK 
data. 
4. 1 No HK data. HK telemetry 
will appear as all 11 0 11 s. 
4. 2 HK telemetry data will be 
erroneous, for all 90 channels. 
4. 3 Only one HK telemetry 
channel will be transrnitted. 
4. 4 Loss of 8 or 12 HK Data 
channels. 
4. 4. 1 Loss of 8 HK Data channel 
4. 4. 2 Loss of a group of 12 HK 
gate drive signal. I 4. 4. 2 Loss of a bank of 12 lst I Data measurements. 
Tier HK channels controlling 2nd 
4. 4. 2 Failed FET is for 2nd Tier Tier FET will not turn ON. 
gate drive signal. 
~- J(EI.T. 
ATM 863_1_ 
PAGE ..ll_of _1_8_ 
nA.TE: 
r· · Mav 28. illO 
FAILURE I CRITIC-
PROBABII:,ITY ALJTY 
ax tc 5 
35.876 
17. 938 
17.938 
1954.547 
149.813 
-
492. 623 
I -434.159 
-
552.415 
-
385.661 
-
166. 754 
-
CIRCUIT 
OR 
FUNCTION 
TABLE II 
!SYSTEM rRFP~RED BY 
ALSEP iA_Zl J. ~Mansour 
lEND ITEM Jtw3 NCJ. 90 Ch. Multiplexe 2338900 
FAILURE MODE, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS ~uencer f"¥/~~·909 
EFFECT CF FAILURE 
ASSUMED FAILURE MODE 
4. 5 Bit Output of shift register 
fails in the logic 11 1 11 state. 
CAUSE OF FAILURE 
4. 5 Either the Logic 11 0n FET fail 
in the off mode or the Logic "l" 
FET fails in the ON mode. 
END ITEM 
4. 5 Sequencer will provide mul-
tiple FET gate drive pulses. 
4. 5. l Two channels for each l st 
4. 5. l Failure is for a l st Tier F+ Tier bank of 12 FETS will be on 
gate drive signal. simultaneously. (exception-when 
failed channel should be ON. ) 
4. 5. 2 Failure is for a 2nd Tier F T 
Gate drive signal. 4. 5. 2 Two 2nd Tier FET gates wi 
be continuously ON. (Exception-
when remaining seven 2nd Tier 
FETS are turned OFF). 
SYSTEM 
4. 5 Either 78 or 82 HK data mea-
surements are erroneous. The 
multiplexer becomes effectively 
inoperative. 
4. 5. I All but eight HK Data mea-
surements will be erroneous. 
4. 5. 2 All but 12 HK Data measure 
ments will be erroneous. 
5. 0 Reset Logic IS. 0 The reset logic becomes in-
operative. 
5. 0 MOS Logic fails to generate 
the necessary timing functions. 
5. 0 Sequencer becomes inoperativt.s. 0 Loss of all HK Telemetry Los 
of 90th Frame pulse to the Data 
6. 0 The 90th 
!Frame Pulse 
lcircuit 
5. I Reset logic output fails in the I 5. I Output MOS FET either fails 
logic 11 0 11 state. 
5. 2 Reset logic output fails in the 
logic 11 1 11 state. 
or is slaved to the on mode, thus 
providing a + l2v to the reset input 
of each shift register. 
5. 2 Output MOS-FET either fails 
or is slaved to the OFF mode, thu 
providing a -l2v to the reset input 
of each shift register. 
6. 0 The 90th Frame Pulse circuitl6. 0 Failure of the MOS Logic or 
becomes inoperative. MOS to DTL interface circuit. 
5. I Sequencer will clock out to 
HK channel #l and remain there. 
However, 90th Frame pulse will 
not be generated. 
5. 2 Sequencer will eventually turn 
all HK channels on simultaneously 
6. 0 The analog multiplexer will 
continue to function properly. 
6. I The 90th Frame pulse is not 
generated. 
6. 1 The circuit output transistor 16. I Same as 6. 0 
either fails in the ON mode, or 
is slaved to the ON mode. 6. 2 Same as 6. 0 
6. 2 The 90th Frame pulse is con-
tinuously present. 6. 2 The cct output xstr opens or i• 
slaved to the off condition. 
Proc. 
5. I Loss of 89 HK data measure-
ments. No 90th Frame pulse sig-
nal will be sent to the Data Pro-
cessor. 
5. 2 All HK Data will be erroneous 
A 90th Frame pulse signal will be 
sent to the Data Processor once 
every 0. 6 sec. 
6. 0 Loss of HK channel reference. 
Data Proc. Frame counter be-
comes inoperative. 
6. 1 HK data stream will have to 
be synchronized on known data 
channels. 
6. 2 Data Pro c. Frame counter is 
slaved to the reset state, The 
DIP even frame mark & heat flow 
90th F. mark become erroneous. 
lf'l0· ~ ATM-86ll_ 
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[)ATE 
lMav _28. 1970 
FAILURE 
PROBABILITY 
Q x IC-5 
325. 537 
196.651 
128.886 
35.876 
17.938 
17. 938 
297. 302 
141.177 
156. 125 
CRITIC-
ALITY 
5 
3 
TABLE III 
j:>YSTEM ~ BY NJ. llE\Z 
A T..<:F'P 1 A2.l J. Mansour IATM 863 I --' 
ITEM 
90 Ch Multiplexer 
FAILURE MODE:, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET MUXGate Brd. I & 2 
PART/COMPOI£NT 
SYMBOL 
FAILURE MODE 
( oc) 
EFFECT OF 
ASSEMBLY 
!. 0 Board No. I !. 0 Loss of one ( 1) FET channel in thE 
IST Tier caused by the following 
mode of failure. 
1. 0 Loss of one ( 1) HK Data Channel 
or Board No. 2 
IST Tier 
MX02D MOS 
FET GATES 
Brd No. 1, 
MX02D location 
X1-4, X6-9. 
Brd. No. 2 
MX02D Lo-
cation X1-4, 
X6-8 
!. 1 Identified part fails short from 
Drain to Substrate (0. 1059) 
!. 2 Short: Drain to Gate, or Gate to 
Substrate. (0. 1588) 
!. 3 Open cct on input terminal of 
Drain or Gate of one (1) MOS 
Channel. 
!:J.V > T 
IOV 
(0. 3706) 
2. 0 Board Nos. 1 & 21 2. 0 
IST Tier MX02D 
Failure affecting the six (6) channeli 2. 0 
of an MX02D part in the identified 
manner. MOS FET Gates 
Board No. 1 
MX020 Location 
X1-4, X6-9 
Board No. 2: 
MX020 Location 
X1-4, X6-8 
2. 1 Open cct on the Source or Substrate 
(. 0047) 
2. 2 Electrical Short: Source to 
Substrate or Drain to Source or 
Source to Gate on MX02D (XB) of 
Board No. 2 
(0. 1176) 
Loss of Six ( 6) Housekeeping Data 
Channels 
FAILURE FAILURE I CRITIC-
I PROBABILJTY ALITY END ITEM Q x 1o-:> 
!. 0 Multiplexer will continue to ope r-
ate, minus the loss of affected 
channel. 
l. 1 Affected HK Data Channel appears 
as all "Is" regardless of selected 
redundant multiplexer. Remain-
ing 89 HK Channels are good. 
1. 2 Analog Channel willnot turn on. 
l. 3 Analog Channel will not turn on. 
2.0 Mux will function minus six 
affected channels. Redundant 
switch over will restore full capa-
bility. 
2. 1 Data for Six conservative HK chan-
nels will read all "Os" 
2.2 HK Data Chs. 85-90 would measure 
either all 110 1 s 11 or 11 ls 11 
80 l. 717 
133. 617 
200.43 
467. 67 
120.78 3 
5. 94 
14. 84 
TABLE III 
!SYSTEM 
ALSEP (A2) 
~QI~ Multiplexer 
Y."Wan~ur ffTM 863 r-"• 
pW6 NO, . L.. 
23389oo __ rAGE 14 of 18 
FAILURE MODE:, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET IAS5'Y MUX Gate Brd. I &. ~~03/8906 ft~Y 28, 1970 
~RT/~NT 
SYMBOL 
3. 0 MX02D MOS 
FET Gates on 
Boards No. 1 or 
2 as indicated 
3. 1 Location X 1-4 
and X6-9 (X6-7 
on Brd. No. 2) 
3. 2 Location X5 on 
Boards No. 1 
or 2 
FAILURE MODE 
(OC) 
3. 0 Failure of a six (6) Ch MX02D 
MOS FET as indicated. 
3. 1 Electrical Short Source to Sub-
strate Source to Drain or 
Source to Gate (0. 1647) 
3. 2 Electrical Short from Drain to 
Substrate (0. 0141) 
3. 2. 1 Short cct from Gate to Drain or 
Gate to Substrate. Open cct on 
input terminal of Gate or Drain 
of one channel. 
(0. 0459) 
4, 0 MX02D, X5 I 4. 0 Failure of 2nd Tier multichannel 
on Board No. 21 MOS FET Gate as follows: Open 
on Source or Substrate 
(0. 0047) 
5. 0 MXOZD, X5 on I 5. 0 Failure of 2nd Tier gate as 
Board No. 1 follows: Open cct on Source or 
Substrate 
(0. 0047) 
6.0 MX02D, X5 on 6.0 Failure of either 2nd Tier Gate 
Boards No. I as follows: Elect Short from 
or 2 Source to Drain 
(0. 0141) 
7. 0 MX02D. XS on 7.0 The 2nd Tier gate fails short cct 
Boards No. I from Source to Substrate or 
or 2 Source to Gate. 
(0. 0094) 
EFFECT OF 
ASSEMBLY 
3. 0 Loss of twelve ( 12) Housekeeping 
Data Channels 
4.0 
5. 0 
6.0 
!. 0 
Loss of Forty-Two (42) House-
keeping Data Channels. 
Loss of Forty-eight (48) House-
keeping Data Channels. 
Loss of 78 or 84 HK Data 
Channels 
Loss of all HK Data Channels. 
FAILURE 
END ITEM 
FAILURE I CRITIC-
PROBABI~TY ALITY 
__Q_x 10 
3. 0 Good HK Data reduced to 78 
channels. Redundnat switch over 
will restore full capability. 
3. 1 The digital data for the affected 
12 channels will reflect the sum 
of the e r ros voltage and the 
analog signaL 
3. 2 The +12V error voltage will be 
summed with the sampled analog 
signaL 
3. 2. 1 The 2nd Tier analog channel will 
not turn on. 
4, 0 Multiplexer degraded by approxi-
mately 47% of capability. Full 
capability restored by redundant 
switchovers HK Channels 49-90 
are affected. 
44.39 
20.78 
17. 82 
57.9 
5.94 
5. 0 Loss of HK Data Channels 1-48. I 5, 94 
Full capability restored by switch-
over to redundant sides. 
6, 0 Twelve or Six data channels would I I 7. 82 
still be good. However, practical~ 
speaking identifying the correct 
data channels would be difficult. 
7. 0 All HK Data is lost. Redundant 
switchover will restore full 
capability. 
11. 88 
2 
6 
4 
TABLE III f>'YSTEM ~ 
ALSEP_ (A4) I J. Mansour 
~ ITEM fWG NO. 
_2Q_<;;h. _M_uli_iplexer 2338900 
FAILURE MODE:, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET ~s·y ~ Sequencer r 2338909 
~RT/COMPOioENT 
SYMBOL 
1. 0 DT L- MOS Inter~ !. 0 
face circuit and 
designated piec<l 1. I 
parts. 
l. 1 Resistors: Rl, 
R2 and R3 
Diode: CR! 
l. 2 XSTRS: Qland 
Q2 UL02C- I 1.2 
X3: NGIA 
2.0 Phase two (02 ) 2.0 Clock Genera-
tor Resistors: 2. I 
R5, UL02G-
X3: NGIB 
2. 2. 
FAILURE MODE (a.) 
Open or short cct 
Open Get: Rl, R2, R3 Ql, C-E, 
C-B, E-B, Q2, C-E, C-B, B-E, 
ShortCct: CR!, Ql, E-B, B2, 
E-B, C-B, NGIA: Fails in logic 
'
1 1 11 state. 
(0. 0452) 
Open Cct: CR! 
Short Get: Ql, C-E, C-B, Q2, 
C-E, NGIA: Fails logic "O" state. 
(0. 0665) 
Open or short 
Open Get: NGIB: Fails logic "I or 
o~~. 
(0. 005) 
"""" coe, ., - P•'"m"'"' DoH< I 
NUIB turn on, turn off character-
istics Degrades 
(0. 0007) 
1.0 
l.l 
1.2 
2.0 
2. 1 
2.2 
EFFECT OF 
ASSEMBLY 
The DTL-MOS interface cct be-
comes inoperative. 
Voltage level shifter fails in the 
logic ''0'' state. 
Voltage level shifter fails in the 
logic 11 1 11 state. 
The r;/
2 
Clock Generator circuit 
becomes inoperative. 
Loss of r;/
2 
clock pulse. Output 
continuously@ +or - !2V. 
r;i
2 
clock pulse becomes eratic 
i.e. multiple pulses, pulses over-
lap with r;/
1 
pulses, etc. 
FAILURE 
1.0 
1.1 
1.2 
2.0 
2. 1 
2.2 
END ITEM 
Sequencer shift register will not 
advance. Multiplexer will be 
slaved to the last data channel 
sampled. 
A-6V is continuously applied to the 
input of the jJ clock generator. 
The mux adv~nce pulse is inhib-
ited. 
A tl2V is continuously applied to 
the input of the r;/2 clock generator 
cct. The mux advance pulse is 
inhibited. 
The Shift Register can not be 
sequenced. Multiplexer will 
remain in the last analog channel 
sampled. 
The r;/
1 
clock pulse can not be 
generated. Loss of both clock 
pulses disables the shift register. 
The Shift Register will not se-
quence properly. 
I 
•• 
I 
~TM 863 fE"• 
PAGE 15 of" 18 
~ 28, 1970 
FAILURE I CRITIC-
PROBABI~TY ALITY 
Q X 10 
371. 045 2 
150. 1454 
220.900 
17.474 I 6 
15. 149 -
2.325 . -
TABLE III ISVSTEM f'REPAI£D BV 
ALSEP (A21 I J. Mansour fER> ITEM .. fWG NO. 
go Ch. Multiolexe 2338900 
FAILURE MODE, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET jASS'Y - ~ NQ. Sequencer 23389Qg 
~ ~. ATM-Rt.~····· 
PAGE 1 " of' 1 R 
~y 28, 1970 
~RT/CCJMI>OioENT 
SYMBOL 
EFFECT OF FAILURE FAILURE CRITIC-
3.0 Phase One 
(¢' 
1
) Clock 
Generator 
Resitors: 
R6, and R7 
Cauac:tors:C 
anti C3D;ode: 
CR~. UL02CI 
-X3: NGIC 
UL02C-X2: 
NG2A, B 
UL02C-X5: 
NG3D 
FAILURE MODE ( ()(.) 
3.0 Open or short 
3. ~ Open Cct: CL, R7, NGIC fails 
in logic 11 0 11 state. 
Short Cct: C~. CR3, NGIC fails 
in logic 11 0 11 state. 
(0. 0087) 
3. 2 NGIC fails in the logic "I" state. 
(0. 0021) 
3. 3 As shown below. 
3. 3. I NG2A fails in Off mode NG2B fails 
in logic 11 1 11 state. 
(0. 0054) 
3. 3. 2 NG3D fails in logic "1" state 
NG2B fails in logic "0" state. 
(0. 0054) 
3. 0 
ASSEMBLY 
The ~ Clock Generator circuit 
becor:Jes inoperative. 
3. I Loss of ¢'1 clock pulse. Output 
continuously @ +12V. 
3. 3 The 0 clock output pulses 
remaibs continuously@ -l2V. 
3. 4 The OR Logic the 2nd teir 0 
gating function becomes inoJera-
tive. 
3. 4. l The 2nd Tier 0
1 
clock pulse fails 
to occur. 
3. 4. 2 The 2nd Tier 0
1 
clock pulse is 
continuously present. 
3. 0 
END ITEM 
The Shift Register can not be 
sequenced properly. 
3. I Multiplexer will remain in the 
last analog channel sampled. 
3. Z. The Shift Register bit cutouts will 
shift to c.lllogi-: 11 0 11 • All HK 
aat.a channels will be in the 
Off n'lode. 
3. 3 The sequencer operation becomes 
erratic. A minimum of 78 HK 
data channels will be lost. 
3. 3. l The 2nd Tier Shift register will 
hang up in its last state. 
3. 3. 2 All 2nd Tier gates will eventually 
turn on. 
PROBABI~TY 
Q X 10 
ALITY 
71. 752 4 
28.980 -
7.419 
-
35.876 
17. 938 
17.938 
TABLE III J5'1'STEM ~B'i' 
A LSEP IA2J I J. Mansour ~-863 rv. 
f"-i2~09 
~ ITEM FWG NO. 
90_CILMullinlexer 2338900 
FAILURE MOD~, EFFECT&. CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET JASS'Y Sequencer 
E_AGE 17 of' 18 
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Fli\RT/~NT 
SYMBOL 
4. 0 lst and 2nd 
Tier Shift 
Register 
Shift Regist-
er: AI, AZ 
Resistors: 
Rl4 thruR24 
R27 thru R331 
MX02D: NG4 
NG5, NG6 
UL02C-X5: 
NG 3C 
FAILURE MODE 
(a.) 
4. 0 Open or short 
4, I A 1, A2 fails in reset state NG4, 
NG5, NG3C or NG6 fails logic 
11QI1
0 
(0. 0451) 
4. 2 Al, A2 Vin function continuously 
present, Set output of first stage 
fails logic "0" NG4, NG5, or NG6 
fails in logic !1)' 1 state. 
(0, 1483) 
4, 3 AI S. R. Any stage fails in the 
logic 11 0 11 output. 
(0. 1307) 
4, 4 AI or AZ Shift Register Resistors: 
Rl4-24, 27-37. 
4, 4, 1 AI S. R, fails. A bit output stage 
remains slaved or shorted in the 
On Mode, NG4, NG5 shorts thus 
failing in logic "0" state Rl3 -23: 
Open Cct, 
(0. 1161) 
4, 4, 2 A2 S. R. fails similar to A 1 above 
R25, R27-33: Open Cct NG~fails 
logic 11 0' 1 stat~. 
(0.0502) 
4. 5 Shift Register AI or AZ 
4, 5, I Al, bit output FET fails to turn on 
NG4, NGS fails in logic 11 1 11 mode. 
(0, 0592) 
4. 5, 2 A2 bit output FET fails to turn on 
NG6 fails in logic ''In mode. 
(0.0388) 
EFFECT OF 
ASSEMBLY 
4. 0 The 12 Bit Serial to Parallel 
Shift Register becomes in-
operative. 
4. 1 All output stages fail in the logic 
IIQII State. 
4. 2 All output stages fail in logic 
11 111 state. 
4. 3 Shift Register fails to sequence. 
4. 4 A bit output stage of Shift 
Register fails in the logic 11 0 11 
state. 
4, 4, 1 Failure in the AI Shift Register 
or Pulldown resistors. 
4. 4, 2 Failure is in the AZ Shift Registe 
4, 5 Bit Output of S. R. AI or AZ fails 
in the logic 11 1 11 state. 
4. 5, l Failure is for a lst Tier FET 
gate drive signaL 
4. 5, 2 Failure is for a 2nd Tier FET 
gate drive signal. 
FAILURE 
END ITEM 
4. 0 The multiplexer gating sequence 
becomes inoperative or erratic. 
4. I All multiplexer MOS-FET gates 
will be turned off. 
4. 2 All multiplexer gates will be 
turned on simultaneously. 
4. 3 Only one (I) HK data channel will 
be transmitted, 
4. 4. Either 8 or 12 HK Data channels 
will be lost. 
4. 4. 1 Every 12th date in the first Tier 
for the affected drive pulse will 
note turn on. (Maximum of 8 
channels will be lost), 
4. 4, 2 One of eight second Tier gates 
will fail to turn on Loss of 12 
HK data channels. 
4. 5 The Sequencer will provides 
multiple FET gate drive pulses, 
A minimum of 78 HK Data Chan-
nels will be erroneous. 
4. 5. 1 Two channels in each 1st Tier 
bank will remain on simultaneous-
ly. 
4. 5. 2 Two 2nd Tier gates will be on 
simultaneously. 
FAILURE I CRITIC-
PROBABI~TY ALITY 
Q X 10 
1954.547 I 1 149.813 
-
492.623 
-
434.159 . 
-
552,415 
-
385.661 
-
!66.754 
325.537 
196.65! 
128.65! 
TABLE III 
~RT/COMP<li€NT 
SYMBOL 
5. 0 Reset Logic 
UL02C-X5: 
NG3A NG3B 
6. 0 90th Frame 
Pulse cir-
cuit Q3, Q4, 
R8, R9, RlO 
Rll, Rl2, 
CR4. 
TABLE III 
FAILURE MOOt:, EFFECT & CRITICALITY ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
FAILURE MODE 
((X.) 
5. 0 Open or short 
5. l NG3A output continuously at 
5. 2 
6.0 
6. l 
6.2 
-12 V. NG3B output continuously! 
attl2V. 
(0. 0054) 
NG3A output continuously at 
tl2V. NG3B output continuously! 
at -l2V. 
(0. 0054) 
Open or short 
Short Cct. Q4, CE, Q3 CE, 
Rll and Rl2: Open. 
(0. 0425) 
Short Cct. Q3 BE 
Open Cct. R9, RlO, CR4, Q4 
CE, Q3 CE. 
(0. 047) 
EFFECT OF 
ASSEMBLY 
5. 0 The reset logic becomes in-
operative. 
5. l Reset logic fails in the logic 
11 0'' state. 
5. 22 Reset logic fails in the logic 
11 1 n state. 
6. 0 The 90th Frame Pulse circuit 
becomes inoperative .. 
6. l The 90th Frame Pulse circuit 
not generated. 
6. 2 The 90th Frame Pulse is 
continuously present. 
JSYSTEI'f f'REAI'I£0 BY 
ALSEP (A2) I J. Mansour rf·M- 863 fE"• f'l() ITEM .... pwG NO, 
90 Ch. Multiplexer! 2338900 
IASS'Y m r? Sequencer 33 09 
FAILURE 
END ITEM 
5. 0 All 90 channels will be lost. 
Sequencer will not transmit a 
90th Frame Pulse to the Data 
Processor. 
5. l Sequencer will clock out to HK 
channel #l and remain there 
90th Frame Pulse will not be 
generated: 
5. 3 Sequencer will eventually turn 
all HK channels on simultaneous 
ly. 
6. 0 The Multiplexer will continue 
to function. However, Data 
Processor operation will be 
degraded. 
6. l HK Data stream will have to be 
synchronized on known data 
channels. 
6.2 Data Processor Frame Counter 
is slaved to the reset state. 
IPAGE 18 of' 18 
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FAILURE I CRITIC-
PROBABI~TY ALITY 
Q X 10 
35.876 5 
17.938 
17.938 
297. 302 3 
141. 177 
156. 125 
